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Abstract
The exponential increase on the internet of indecent images of children (IIOC) has been
followed by a transformation within criminal justice. The scale, nature and rapid technological
evolution of such crimes—often of distant initial geographical origin—requires collaborative
justice and harm reduction arrangements with internet companies and NGOs. The diminished
reach (declining criminal justice interventions) and power (even in identifying crimes for
intervention) of state authority with the current collaborative model, however, has resulted in
inadequate social regulation and policing in response to IIOC crimes on the surface web. There
is a considerable risk that the Online Harms White Paper proposals to establish overarching
government authority to generally reduce harmful conduct will not fully resolve problems that
go much wider than the technological, commercial and consumer protection on the surface
web issues emphasised in that document. Only political choices about funding and fundamental
rights compliant legislation can (a) prevent the hollowing out of criminal justice capacity and
capabilities to deal with IIOC offenders and (b) ensure an essential compatibility and con-
sistency in police operational ability—including the access sought to anonymised communi-
cation data via an encryption key—and legal principles when dealing with IIOC crimes across all
levels of the internet, including ‘the dark web’. These issues are examined as a case study in
civic epistemology about the influence of neoliberalism in technologically focused policy
making.
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Introduction
The concept of collaborative justice appears to have originated in the USA as a description of innovative
penal thinking.1 This original usage implies: (a) internal initiatives (framed solely with reference to
criminal justice objectives) to find external partners that can fix limitations of structure, processes and
expertise (e.g. for responding to offenders’ complex personal problems); and (b) that state institutions
retain agency (absolute control over decisions to collaborate or not, and, when collaboration takes place,
over its form and duration). This concept2 provides the framework within this article for examining the
extent to which cybercrime has been allowed—far beyond what was envisaged in the original US
collaborative model—to be a disruptive force that reconfigures criminal justice. As such it is a case
study in how neoliberal governments present policy decisions and developments that affect everyday life
and reshape society—not as political choices—but as matters so determined3 by apparently impersonal
economic and technological forces that there is no alternative (often given emphasis through its expres-
sion as an acronym: TINA).4
The transformative potential of the neoliberal dominance over Government policy making can be
seen in the significantly different collaborative justice model that has emerged for the policing or social
regulation of IIOC (falling within the broader category of ‘child sex abuse images’, CSAIs5) in England
and Wales. As will be seen below, it can be distinguished from the original American model by a far
greater reliance on voluntary harm reduction or prevention by commercial organisations and industry
funded NGOs than criminal justice interventions. Also the form and terms of the partnership with
industry, especially ISPs and social media companies, and NGOs are no longer determinable solely
within the public sphere. This model signifies: (a) a major retreat from a foundational concept of the
state: that all actions deemed criminal under its laws are prioritised politically (in criminal justice policy)
and quasi-judicially (including via prosecutorial discretion) as sufficiently grave to warrant state inter-
vention; and (b) a change in power relationships as increasingly the state’s ability to respond to certain
crimes relies on often variable levels of voluntary compliance by powerful non-state partners, whose
resources and political influence on technological issues may rival that of governments diminished by
neoliberalism.6
1. For example (to quote a US website devoted to this approach): ‘Court community and criminal justice professionals join forces
to analyze problems and create responsive solutions; and judges, court administrators, prosecutors, defense attorneys, probation
and parole representatives, corrections personnel, victim advocates, law enforcement officers, and public and private treatment
providers reach out to one another to forge partnerships that will enable them to address complex medical, social, fiscal, and
behavioural problems that pose significant threats to the safety and well–being of our communities’. <https://www.collabor
ativejustice.org/what.htm> accessed 3 January 2020.
2. The starting point is similar to Broadhurst’s identification of a ‘comity’ of government: NGOs, industry, LEAS and academia
cooperating to improve awareness of and disrupt child sexual exploitation, but the central question in this article is how such
cooperation can under certain conditions transform the criminal justice system. See R Broadhurst, ‘Child Sex Abuse Images and
Exploitation’ in R Leukfeldt and TJ Holt (eds), The Human Factor of Cybercrime (Routledge, London 2020) 330.
3. A parallel can be drawn with the ideological or deterministic claims about the need to embrace economic reconfiguration
through ‘emerging technologies with the most potential to disrupt industries and transform business models’, KPMG, The
Changing Landscape of Disruptive Technologies: Tech Hubs Forging new Paths to Outpace the Competition (KPMG Inter-
national Cooperative, Zurich 2018) 1.
4. This point is also made in a general consideration of democratic accountability and policing in B Bowling, R Reiner and J
Sheptycki, The Politics of the Police (5th edn OUP, Oxford 2019). This has wider resonance as highly centralised levers of
power are increasingly manipulated on behalf of small groups of lobbyists. See C Crouch, Post Democracy (Polity, Cambridge
2004).
5. For example, prima facie non-erotic images of children that are used ‘inappropriately’ for sexual gratification are included
within this term: M Yar, ‘The Policing of Internet Sex Offences: Pluralised Governance Versus Hierarchies of Standing’ (2013)
23 Polic Soc 484.
6. The ‘pluralism’ noted by scholars of policing has resulted in fuzzier distinctions between (a) public and private law, and social
control and (b) how data sharing between public and private entities has increased the capacity for surveillance and inter-
vention. This has resulted in moves away from state-centric policing: see Bowling et al. (n 4).
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A systemic risk inherent in this model is a gradual hollowing out of capacity and capability within the
criminal justice system to deal with IIOC offenders. Criminal justice interventions against IIOC
crimes—equivalent to ‘the tip of the iceberg’ (as noted from police statements and analysed statistically
in the second section) have been largely replaced by industry funded and delivered social regulation,
principally in the form of disruption or image suppression. Thus the initial identification of IIOC
material that—for probably the great majority of such abhorrent crimes7—determines whether offenders
are either dealt with through the criminal justice system or allowed impunity has been vested in private
entities, some of whom contribute little even to these voluntary collaborative arrangements. This
demonstrates a weakening of the state’s response since 2013 when Yar concluded that, in contrast to
other areas of internet crime during the period studied, the policing of child abuse offences (not just
IIOC, but such offences fall within and are central to his analysis) were accorded ‘an unusual degree of
direct intervention by state-centred authorities’.8
The article begins by describing two concepts—critical trust and civic epistemology—as they are
used here—to understand the nature of public trust in government decision making concerned with risk
management in scientifically and technologically focused policy making. The current collaboration
model in which the state has yielded much of its authority over policing IIOC crimes is described in
the second section. The third section seeks to unpick the reasons for signs of decline in criminal justice
interventions, and the consequences of this, principally the risks arising from any hollowing-out of the
criminal justice system that cannot be offset by improvements in image suppression. Technological
limitations on the scope for social regulation via state-industry collaboration, notably because of the dark
web (better described as anonymous communication networks: ACNs), ‘going dark’ in general (e.g.
encryption) and relatively simple evasion (e.g. switching to a Russian ISP) are examined in the fourth
section. This includes how the state’s ability to respond to IIOC crimes in such environments requires
matching safeguards for all its powers and activities that engage privacy and fair trial rights. The fifth
section reviews two Government initiatives: the policy document, the Online Harms White Paper,9
published by the May administration but still the direction of travel under Johnson, and an attempt in
July 2019 to negotiate a government-industry encryption key accord. These are analysed for evidence of
a fundamental break with the earlier and neoliberal influenced policies towards the role of internet
companies in helping to respond to IIOC crimes. The conclusions suggest how insights from the critical
trust civic epistemology concepts used in this case study can help to find a way forward on these complex
and contentious issues.
Understanding Government Technologically Focused Decision
Making: Critical Trust and Civic Epistemology
Walport, writing as the UK Government’s then Chief Scientific Adviser, advocated critical trust as a
means of addressing concerns held by lay citizens about the trustworthiness of an institution to manage
scientific and technological risks:
7. Of the 105,047 IIOC URLs analysed by the IWF in 2018, 23% (24% of which were believed to be of children under two) were
Category A: ‘showing sexual activity between adults and children including rape or sexual torture’, Internet Watch Foundation
(IWF), Once Upon a Year: the Internet Watch Foundation Annual Report 2018. (IWF, Cambridge 2019) 18.
8. See Yar (n 5) 491.
9. DDCMS and the Home Office, Online Harms White Paper, (CP 57, 2019). This was published by the May administration, but
legislation to implement this was indicated in the post-2019 General Election Queen’s Speech (i.e. by the Johnson adminis-
tration) on 19 December 2019 <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/queens-speech-december-2019> accessed 20
December 2019.
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Most of us have neither the time nor the expertise to examine every decision or explore all the evidence. We
rely on judgements about the values and behaviours of those in charge. For the individual, ‘critical trust’ may
be the best frame of mind: neither outright scepticism nor uncritical acceptance.10
This approach is important for avoiding the idea that the conferring of trust or trustworthiness is a simple
binary decision (i.e. an institution is trusted or it is not).
Ward’s analysis of the judicial scrutiny of the reliability of scientific expert evidence in English
criminal trials, in acknowledging the relevance of critical trust alongside its limitations, offers an insight
that strengthens the concept’s potential analytical value: the object of critical trust is not an individual
judgement or claim, but confidence in a complex system of interlocking forms of regulation and
scrutiny.11 This is not dissimilar to the scrutiny process—taking written and oral testimony from
government and experts (often judiciously selected for their contrary views and opinions) in order to
test government actions, policies and proposals for legislation –that Parliament uses (not always suc-
cessfully) to hold the Executive to account.12
It is suggested here that the value of critical trust would be much greater if combined with an
understanding of the fundamental ideas and assumptions the trusted themselves rely on. The origins
of critical trust in a study by Walls et al. of perceptions of health and safety regulation reported that
people who have only limited knowledge of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE)’s work generally
trusted it to act ‘altruistically’ in the public interest. Significantly, they were also aware of possible
limitations on the HSE’s effectiveness and independence, such as lack of resources and government
influence.13 That, however, still leaves a gap in respect of ‘the values and behaviours of those in charge’,
especially the possible prevalence of fundamental ideas and assumptions the trusted experts or institu-
tions themselves rely on or take for granted.
In otherwords, are there cultural and socio-economic dispositions or group-think14 thatmay restrict the
range of options considered, or the seriousness with which some options are examined by decision
makers? For example, the assumption in favour of ‘self-regulation’ or ‘light regulation’ 15 that proved
so damaging within the finance industry may still flourish relatively unchecked as ‘independent regula-
tion’16, or as a modified approach in which regulation is sufficient if it bears most heavily on the major
entities in a market.17 As will be seen below, these concepts that are so influential in neoliberal thinking
generally about the role of government can be traced in the emergence of the problems that beset the
current model of collaborative justice and harm reduction. They are also pivotal to understanding the
10. Annual Report of the Government Chief Scientific Adviser 2015. Forensic Science and Beyond: Authenticity, Provenance and
Assurance (Government Office for Scienc, London 2015) 10.
11. T Ward, ‘Explaining and Trusting Expert Evidence’ (2020) 3 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 233–254.
12. Often scrutiny tends to result in lesser or medium degrees of policy change, unless the Government had already planned to
make the recommended changes: P Lynch and R Whitaker, ‘Select Committees and Brexit: Parliamentary Influence in a
Divisive Policy Area’ (2019) 72 Parliam Aff 923. This need not necessarily be so. For a comparison of the general effec-
tiveness of Westminster scrutiny compared with Germany, The Netherlands, Nordic countries and Scotland see A King and I
Crewe, The Blunders of our Governments (Oneworld, London 2013) 371–4.
13. J Walls, N Pidgeon, A Weyman and T Horlick-Jones, ‘Critical Trust: Understanding Lay Perceptions of Health and Safety
Risk Regulation’ (2004) 6 Health Risk Soc 133.
14. For both theoretical underpinning and case studies of group think in UK government decision making, see King and Crewe (n
12) 255–67.
15. M Mazzucato, The Value of Everything (Penguin, London 2019) 110–34.
16. For example, D Currie, The Currie Lecture given to the Cass Business School in London on 21 May 2014: The case for the
British model of independent regulation 30 years on <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-case-for-the-british-
model-of-independent-regulation-30-years-on> accessed 29 April 2020.
17. This was the foundational idea for strengthening bank regulation after the 2008 Financial Crisis for the Basel III accord on
bank capital requirements: A Tooze, Crashed: How a Decade of Financial Crises Changed the World (Allen Lane, London
2018) 311–4.
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potential limitations of theOnline Harms proposals and some of the risks in how encryption key access is
being sought.
This approach to critical trust draws on insights from Jasanoff’s studies. She conceptualises the
credibility of science and technology ‘in contemporary political life as a phenomenon to be explained,
not to be taken for granted’18 and equally importantly (in a different context) stresses the need to avoid
‘strategic deletions and omissions’.19 One of the strengths of her approach is that it is culturally and
historically specific to the different models of democratic society in which issues are deliberated and the
legal order20 under which decisions are enacted. For example, one of her studies explains how a
contentious scientific regulatory issue was resolved after an exceptionally inclusive and unorchestrated
public consultation by settling on a precautionary approach. This outcome was a surprise to the UK
government scientific and political establishment. They had failed, however, to anticipate the impact of a
scandal that had deeply damaged public confidence in the integrity and competence in government
management of health risks and scientific decision making.21 Many examples of the risks of group-think,
the subtle stifling of dissent among UK government decision makers, or only ‘the survival of ideas that
fit’ can be found in the literature.22 Often these have bypassed effective challenge because public
understanding of other options was not encouraged, poor or constrained by the acceptance of claims
that government decisions were objectively based on economic, scientific and technological knowledge
that confuted alternative choices.
The ‘Tip of the Iceberg’: The Current Collaborative Model and
Trends in Criminal Justice Interventions Against Indecent Web
Images of Children (IIOC)
Senior police officers admit that the criminal justice system is only dealing with the ‘tip of the [internet
child abuse] iceberg’.23 Some officers have expressed the view that the police had reached ‘saturation
point’, and that they and the criminal justice system were ‘not coping’.24 The mirror image to such
statements is that, with the exception of ANCs (anonymous communication networks or the ‘DarkWeb’)
and encrypted communications, web surveillance to find and respond to IIOC images—the 21st-century
equivalent of the police beat officer patrolling the streets—is undertaken largely by commercial entities
or privately funded NGOs, all of whom are currently allowed to be outside the reach of government
regulation.
18. S Jasanoff, Designs on Nature (PUP, Princetown 2005) 250 and 255.
19. S Jasanoff, ‘The Idiom of Co-production’ in S Jasanoff (ed), States of Knowledge (Routledge, Abingdon 2006) 3.
20. ‘An aggregate or a plurality of general and individual norms that govern human behavior, . . . [comprising] legislative acts, acts
constituting legally binding custom, judicial acts, administrative acts, and private law transactions, in particular contracts’: H
Kelsen, ‘The Concept of the Legal Order’ (tr SL Paulson, 1982) 27 American Journal of Jurisprudence 64–65. An outstanding
example of the value of Jasanoff’s approach is her comparative study of the development of embryology regulation and
biotechnology patent law in the UK, Germany and the USA, Jasanoff (n 18) 146–224.
21. The scandal was the cattle disease, BSE, and the contentious scientific regulatory issue was GM food: Jasanoff (n 18) 256–8,
121–30.
22. A much earlier example is the selection of gas cooled reactors in the 1960s: J Kay, The Truth About Markets (Penguin, London
2004) 91–93 and a later example is Prime Minister Thatcher’s ill-fated Poll Tax (collected in England and Wales in 1990–93):
King and Crewe (n 12) 41–63, 256–7 (group-think); 335–337 (ignoring a realistic alternative); and, more recently: A Stevens,
‘Governments cannot just “follow the science” on COVID-19’ (2020) Nat Hum Behav < DOI: https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-
020-0894-x > accessed 27 May 2020.
23. Noted—in the context of on-line abuse—during field work (subject to the Chatham House Rule), for example, at a NPCC
sponsored conference held on 19–21 November 2019. The same phrase, irrespective of internet involvement, is also used
about offences against children generally: Home Affairs Committee, Policing for the Future (HC 2017–19, 10) para 80.
24. Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA), Investigation Report: The Internet (HMSO, Richmond 2020) para 60.
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The Government frequently draws on information provided by this global community when describ-
ing the scale of IIOC offending. An important UK Government 2020 publication25 cited 16.8 million
referrals in 2019 to the US National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) to illustrate
the scale of internet abuse. When doing so it failed to indicate that this figure was a global total, a
significant proportion of the material may have no UK connections and to acknowledge that such data
includes virtual child pornography (VCP),26 imagination based images, such as cartoons and drawings,27
self-generated IIOC images (‘youth sexting’) or, possibly prima facie non-erotic images that may have
had an innocent origin. Such statements, while reflecting important successes in responding to IIOC
crimes, focus on the symptoms and not the causes or direct risks of such offending.
Any account focused on the direct UK causes and risks of IIOC crimes needs to start with an estimate
that this country’s residents are ‘the third-largest global consumers of internet child abuse images’28—a
group of possibly 80,000 individuals29—and the inestimable number of children they harm. If these
estimates are reliable, this level of potential criminality is a daunting initial surveillance challenge for the
police. It is approximately on the same scale as US internet surveillance or espionage against foreign
data subjects revealed by Snowdon, and only about 30,000 short of the number of ‘new entrants’ to the
criminal justice system in England and Wales (many for minor and easily dealt with offences e.g. TV
licence evasion) in the year ending December 2018. 30 Finding ways to reach this group of IIOC
offenders and responding to them as individuals has to be a principle objective of criminal justice policy
relating to web IIOC images and must not be confused with the equally important but offender and
victim remote policy objective: image suppression.
As far as circulated images are concerned, ISPs (Internet Service Providers) and other digital
industry entities have created powerful disruption apparatus. In 2018 the industry-funded IWF (Inter-
net Watch Foundation)31 ensured that 29,865 UK hosted posts were suppressed or ‘taken-down’
quickly (45% within two hours). This appears to have made the UK surface web a comparatively
hostile environment for IIOC commerce. This country’s estimated share of the global total of hosted
child sexual abuse content is believed to have fallen from 18% in 1996 when the IWF was established
to 0.04% in 2018.32 Since 2018 the IWF has been given accessed images collected during police
investigations and recorded on the UK police Child Abuse Database (CAID). The IWF distributes new
CAID images to IWF industry members so that any copies accessible elsewhere through services
controlled by its members can be deleted.33 At first sight, these results suggest that this collaborative
model—based primarily on self–regulation and measured in terms of image suppression, not, as will
be seen below, criminal justice interventions—is a pragmatic response to technologically determined
25. DDCMS and Home Office, Online Harms White Paper—Initial consultation response (DDCMS and Home Office, London
2020) 1.
26. Theoretically computer generate images, but not a straightforward category: AA Gillespie, Cybercrime (Routledge, Abingdon
2019) 249–54.
27. Broadhurst (n 2) 315.
28. Behind the USA and Canada: Home Affairs Committee (n 23) para 83.
29. IICSA, Investigation Report: Children Outside the United Kingdom Phase 2 (HMSO, Richmond 2020) 1.
30. 89,138 NSA surveillance targets in 2013: D Lindsay, ‘The Role of Proportionality in Assessing Trans-Atlantic Flows of
Personal Data’ in DJB Svantesson and D Kloza (eds) Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Relations as a Challenge for Democracy
(Intersentia, Cambridge 2017) 60. 107,174 new entrants: ONS, ‘Offending History Data Tool: First Time Entrants Statistics’
Criminal Justice System statistics quarterly: December 2018, <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/criminal-justice-
system-statistics-quarterly-december-2018> accessed 16 December 2019.
31. In 2017/18 its income of approximately £3million came primarily from industry subscriptions (£2.3miilion; industry repre-
sentatives on its board are drawn from major donors, Google, Microsoft and Virgin Media). It also received a £0.4 M in EU
grant. Internet Watch Foundation Trustees’ Report & Financial Statements For the year ended 31 March 2018 (IWF,
Cambridge 2018).
32. IWF (n 7) 27, 35 and 45.
33. IWF, IWF connects to the Child Abuse Image Database (CAID), 21 March 2018 <https://www.iwf.org.uk/news/iwf-connects-
to-child-abuse-image-database-caid> accessed 25 October 2019.
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change in the nature of crime. In line with neoliberal thinking it also limits the role of the state and
avoids significant public expenditure.
The Government, the IICA (the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse), and in the USA,
the NCMEC (see the last two sections), however, have called for significant reforms to the present
collaborative model so that businesses within regulatory reach cannot evade, for commercial
reasons, their responsibilities to take action against child abuse by their service users. This reflects a
significant change in Government thinking compared with 2017, when a Parliamentary inquiry looking at
wider questions relating to children and internet safety identified a neoliberal preference for industry self-
regulation.34 From a criminal justice perspective, the current commercially led arrangements, possibly
combined with the Government’s somewhat undisciplined emphasis on the scale of global IIOC image
data, also have unanticipated adverse consequences. For example, the greater unfairness (almost akin to
‘entrapment’) riskwhen evidence is gathered by ‘paedophile hunters’, who believe their activities fill a void
left by the police.35
The National Crime Agency (NCA) received from industry sources 113,948 reports of child
sexual abuse material believed to be UK-related in 2018.36 It is impossible to be certain how this
statistic compares with three million images a year being added to CAID in 2019 from devices
seized by the police.37 If, however, the CAID volume is compared to the 2019 estimated 6,000
IIOC arrests annually,38 the number of images for every arrest would average 500. That would be a
comparatively low number given the scale of material seized from individuals in some
investigations.39
There is a considerable volume of evidence to be assessed when taking cases to court, but the
potential burden of work after an arrest has to be seen in context:
There are few defences to the main IIIOC offences relating to making or possessing etc. IIOC
images: s 1 of the Protection of Children Act 1978 or s 160 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988.
They are restricted to law enforcement, national security or within marriage.40
It is estimated that every single mobile device examined by the police can contain an average of
35,000 pages of data that can be downloaded.41 For most crimes, especially in rape investiga-
tions, the search for relevant and admissible digital evidence or identifying disclosable material
will be more difficult and time consuming than dealing with the evidence needed to satisfy
liability for IIOC crimes.
34. Communications Committee, Growing up with the internet (HL 2016–17, 130).
35. Entrapment is not a defence in English law, but the courts may intervene on grounds of unfairness: AA Gillespie ‘“Paedophile
Hunters”: How should the Law Respond?’ (2019) 12 Crim LR 1016-1034; Brants et al. ‘A comparative Analysis of Anglo-
Dutch approaches to “cyber policing”: checks and balances fit for purpose? and Davies ‘Shining a Light on Policing the Dark
Web: An analysis of UK investigatory powers’ in this issue.
36. NSPCC,HowSafe are ourChildren? 2019OnlineAbuse AnOverview ofData onChild AbuseOnline (NSPCC, London 2019) 24.
37. S Preston, ‘New AI Technology to Safeguard Children & Catch More Predators’, Safeguarding News (19 July 2019) <https://
ssscpd.co.uk/news/safeguarding-e-bulletin-18th-july-2019> accessed 3 February 2020.
38. IICSA puts the figure at ‘approximately 400–450’, but that figure was given to inquiry in May 2019, IICSA (n 24) 2.4. The
figure quoted here reflects police officer reports of an ‘average 500 or so each month’ at Chatham House Rule events
organised by City Forum on 24 October 2019 and the NPCC on 19–21 November 2019.
39. Noted at random, R v Adam Magness [2019] EWCA Crim 2071 involved a case of four charges under s 1 PCA 1978 and s 160
CJA 1988 that related to over 27,000 images and 150 ‘movies’.
40. The exemptions are more easily traced in Archbold: Magistrates Court Criminal Practice (11th edn Sweet and Maxwell,
London 2015) 14–62 to 14–63, 14–67 to 14–69.
41. V Baird, Written evidence from Office of the Police and Crime Commissioner for Northumbria (DIS0025) <http://data.par
liament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/justice-committee/disclosure-of-evidence-in-crimi
nal-cases/written/80665.html> accessed 3 February 2020.
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Almost £20 million has been invested in CAID infrastructure, including in 2019 £1.76 million to
fund ‘game-changing’ innovations to CAID to speed up investigations.42
Each newly discovered IIOC image can be given a unique signature (or ‘fingerprint’/’hash’) by using
Microsoft’s PhotoDNA to identify ‘first generation’ images, thus avoiding duplicate recording
when an image has already been placed on a networked criminal justice or NGO database.43
The above points are not made to downplay the demands created by criminal justice interventions
resulting in 22,896 obscene publications offences recorded in England and Wales (the NSPCC suggest
that 94% related to images of children) during 2017/18,44 particularly, as will be considered later, when
making difficult decisions (often involving complex psychological and risk assessments45) about
arrested and convicted offenders. The impact of IIOC offences on criminal justice workloads, however,
should be seen in the context of the exponential rise and additional complexity of both cybercrime
(including online monetary offences and illicit trading) and digital evidence for a much wider range of
offences.46 The overall impact of these digital and cyber trends, including IIOC offences, is not just seen
in the UK, as ‘a threat to [police] capability to investigate such crimes and identify victims’.47
The most detailed statistics (counting offences not defendants) about criminal justice interventions
are summarised below in Table 1. The prosecution to conviction ratios, when expressed as percentages,
Table 1. IIOC and sexual grooming offence statistics 2017 and 2018 (on an all offences charged basis).48
Home Office Offence Code
(n.b. also the key to HO codes
in Figures 1-3 below)
2017 Principal
offence
Prosecution/
Conviction
ratio
2018 Principal
offence
Prosecution/
Conviction
ratio
2017 Non-principal
offence
Prosecution/
Conviction ratio
2018
Non-principal
offence
Prosecution/
Conviction
ratio
86.1 (creation, publication and distribution
of indecent child images)
3,132/3,020
(96.4%)
2,298/2,193
(95.4%)
8,839/8,817
(99.8%)
6,155/6,086
(98.9%)
86.2 (possession of indecent child images) 339/385
(113.6%)
235/248
(105.5%)
1,726/1,633
(94.6%)
1,057/1,041
(98.5%)
86.3 (possession of prohibited child images) 29/47
(162.1%)
29/35
(120.7%)
749/674
(90.0%)
626/550
(87.9%)
88A (‘Sexual grooming’ of a child) 330/241
(73.0%)
441/359
(81.4%)
522/216
(41.4%)
1,027/350
(34.1%)
42. For example, the analysis of 1 TB drive content to identify IIIOC images should take 30 minutes, when previously it would
take up to 24 hours, and 2,000 images an hour should be graded for severity (prior to human inspection) compared 200 if
manually graded, Preston, (n 37).
43. ‘A child sexual abuse image taken by an adult that has not previously been recorded by law enforcement or industry as
indecent’: IICSA (n 24) 111. For PhotoDNA see: ECPAT, Internet and Technology Fact Sheet: What are Hashes? What is
Photo DNA? <https://www.ecpat.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/IT%20Factsheet%20-%20What%20is%20PhotoDNA_0.
pdf> accessed 12 December 2019.
44. NSPCC, (n 36) 23–24. (There were an additional 658 offences in Scotland and 478 in Northern Ireland.)
45. In addition to the issues considered in the next section, the author, when listening to police officers discussing their work,
noted their concern about arrestee suicide risks.
46. For example, see: BBC News, ‘Problems with Disclosure Resulted in the High-profile Collapse of a Number of Prosecutions
for Rape Cases between December 2017 and spring 2018 or in convictions being quashed. MPs criticise head of public
prosecution’s criminal case failures’ (20 July 2018) <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-44892607> accessed 3 February 2020.
47. Europol, Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment (IOCTA) (Europol, The Hague 2018) 31.
48. ONS (n 30), ‘Experimental Statistics: All offences by Home Office Code’.
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Figure 1. Outcomes on a principal disposal basis—HO Code 86.1.
Figure 2. Outcomes on a principal disposal basis—HO Code 86.2.
Figure 3. Outcomes on principal disposal basis—HO Code 88A.
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by showing figures in excess of 100% suggest a reduced flow of new offences prosecuted each year
compared with proceedings completed during that period measurable as convictions.
This downward trend in criminal justice interventions against IIOC offences can be seen more clearly
in the standard criminal statistics summarised in Figures 1 and 2 below, with a comparison with the
markedly different pattern for child sexual grooming at Figure 3 (for the key to the HO codes see
Table 1). 49 Unlike the data summarised in Table 1, these only provide information about the offence
that attracted the most severe sentence or outcome (the principal disposal basis). The volume of IIOC
proceedings doubled between 2013 and 2016 but then fell significantly. While these lack the detail of the
statistics analysed in Table 1, the picture presented by the principal disposal data is also consistent with
the view that ‘the tip of the iceberg’ may well be getting smaller.
The decline in IIOC criminal justice interventions contrasts markedly with the impression given by
police estimates of a national increase in IIOC offences of 424% between 2013–14 and 2017–1850 and an
increase in IWF recorded ‘child sexual abuse URLs’ by 54% between 2015 and 2018.51 The decline in
IIOC proceedings also appears to be greater than general criminal justice trends, for example, the aggregate
12% reduction in the number of arrests nationally between 2016 and 2017.52 With the exception of
grooming, the statistics demonstrate a significant contrast with Yar’s conclusion in 2013 (consistent with
the above data analysis at that time) that, in contrast to other internet crime, the policing of child abuse
offences were accorded ‘an unusual degree of direct intervention by state-centred authorities’.53 It has be
assumed that the reasons for the decline in criminal justice interventions are likely to be attributable to
policy choices, including resource allocation decisions, not changes in criminal behaviour.
Unpicking the Reasons for the Decline in Criminal Justice
Interventions and the Potential Consequences
The political and economic circumstances that gave rise to the current collaborative model and intima-
tions of the risk that—despite the impression created by Online Harms—statutory regulation might not
result in fundamental reform are partly explained by Zuboff’s analysis of ‘surveillance capitalism’: a
concentration of monopolistic capitalism that confers democratically unaccountable and transnational
political power derived from the concentrated ownership of data analysis and communication platforms.
She notes the significance of ‘the neoliberal capture of the government machinery for oversight and
regulation of the US economy’54 for how this developed during the decades that bridged the Millennium,
particularly how the relationship between right-wing politics (neoliberal and libertarian) and the nascent
power of Silicon Valley blocked attempted US government oversight of abusive content on the web.55
This section focuses on aspects and consequences of the neoliberal dominance over policy making
that (a) go beyond Zuboff’s analysis and (b) are criminal justice specific: the reasons for the downward
statistical trends and how, if this is a sign of the hollowing-out of capacity and capability within the
criminal justice system for dealing with IIOC crimes, this could result in risks that cannot be offset by
improvements in image suppression.
49. ONS (n 30), ‘Outcomes by Offence Data Tool (Criminal Justice System Statistics publication: Outcomes by Offence 2008 to
2018: Pivot Table Analytical Tool for England and Wales—Time Period: 12 months ending December 2008 to 12 months
ending December 2018’. (The 2019 data was not available when this article was submitted for publication.)
50. Home Affairs Committee (n 23) para 84.
51. IWF (n 7) 19.
52. ACRO Criminal Records Office, Annual Report 2017-2018 (ACRO, Southampton 2018) 11.
53. Yar (n 5) 491.
54. S Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for the Future at the New Frontier of Power (Profile Books, London
2019) 107, 37–46.
55. Ibid 107–112.
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Inadequate capacity is not a uniquely English problem. This is clear from NCMEC testimony (March
2020) to the US Senate Judiciary Committee:
Relatively static governmental funding to address the horrifying increase in child sexual exploitation content
being circulated worldwide has become an impediment in effectively combatting this problem.56
The Metropolitan Police have acknowledged that criminal justice internet child abuse interventions
have been limited by pressures arising from other contemporary priorities, especially anti-terrorist
activities that pose immediate and severe risks, and fiscal austerity.57 A Parliamentary report has noted
frequently reported backlogs in ‘digital evidence’ work. 58 Fiscal austerity has had an adverse impact
on both the number of police investigators and the availability of forensic science and technology
support.59 Presumably some police child abuse specialists working on IIOC crimes since 2014 have
also been redirected to important investigation of an ever increasing number of historic sexual abuse
allegations.60 Such diversion may only be temporary, but it serves as a reminder that any loss of police
IIOC investigation capacity because of policies premised on the view that industry managed image
suppression is sufficient, is likely to damage the ability to swiftly redeploy some of the staff with
expertise in crimes against children to investigate other forms of child abuse.
Other problems stem from inadequate police resources, including the likelihood that criminal justice
interventions would increasingly reflect UK-centric prioritisation. The Philippines is the greatest source
of IIOC material,61 whereas sexual grooming—where criminal justice interventions continue to rise—
will normally take place in-country. Such policy choices would be consistent with IICA commissioned
research findings about restrictions on known offenders. Only 0.2% of sexual harm prevention orders
imposed in 2017/18 included foreign travel restrictions. The Commission questioned this introspective
approach to child protection. They recommended international intelligence sharing similar to that for
money laundering so that travel restrictions could be targeted proportionately to prevent travel to
destinations notorious for child abuse.62 This recognition of the importance of proportionality also serves
to emphasise that Government policy and police operational priorities cannot just focus on supressing
abuse images. Criminal justice casework tailored to the circumstances and risks of individual offenders,
harm suffered by victims and potential future risks of either offending or harm needs to be adequately
funded.
IIOC offences were not within the remit of the Law Commission’s 2018 scoping study of abusive and
offensive communications,63 but what it stated about the significance of the criminal law in the different
context of its work on online offences is arguably also applicable to web IIOC crimes:
While the challenge of addressing the scale and reach of abusive and offensive online communications may
seem overwhelming, we consider that the law, and in this particular context the criminal law, has an important
role to play in punishing and deterring the most serious conduct, and in shaping community attitudes as to its
unacceptability.64
In a similar tenor the Home Office acknowledged to the IICA—when reporting that diversion strategies
had proved to be more resource-intensive than prosecution and risk management assessments had been
56. J Shehan, Exploited Children Division, NCMEC, Testimony to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (11 March 2020) 5.
57. IICSA (n 24) para 62.4.
58. Home Affairs Committee (n 23) para 88.
59. TJ Wilson, ‘The Impact of Brexit on the Future of UK Forensic Science and Technology’ (2019) 302 Forensic Sci Int 5.
60. V Dodd, ‘Police Uncover “Epidemic” of Child Abuse from1970 s and 80s’, The Guardian (6 February 2020) 1–2.
61. Europol (n 47) 35.
62. IICSA (n 29) 54–55.
63. I Law Commission, Abusive and Offensive Online Communications: A Scoping Report (Law Com No 381, 2018) para 6.1.
64. Ibid para 13.3.
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found to be problematic—that there is a ‘need for justice to be served in terms of victim impact’ by
ensuring that a conviction is recorded.65
Criminal proceedings are distinguishable from social control or aggregate contributions to social
welfare because of a unique retributive function in which due process is integral with the objective of
‘blaming wrongdoers according to their just deserts’.66 Retributive justice should not, however, be
confused with narrow punitiveness, especially bearing in mind that imprisonment often does more harm
than good. Criminal justice interventions must be proportionate to the degree of and responsibility for
harm: for example, in the IIOC context, between primary harm, where an image was produced through
child rape and secondary harm arising from a victim’s recurrent anxiety about the continued circulation
of a partly naked image.67 Prosecutors and judges are not only capable of dealing with such potentially
complex matters, but the fact that their decisions, and the rules or guidelines under which they are made
are open to scrutiny is vital for maintaining critical trust in the criminal justice response to internet IIOC
crimes.
An emphasis on focusing on image suppression over criminal justice interventions against individuals
acquiring IIOC images also means numerous lost opportunities to encourage desistence (even if this may
rely more for success on activities and influence outside the criminal justice system, the criminal justice
intervention may be needed to initiate behavioural change) and, at a minimum, bring the individuals
within sex offender risk management arrangements.
It is unclear whether significant numbers of passive consumers of IIOC images are likely or not to
become contact offenders (e.g. shift their offending to sexual grooming and beyond). Research in this
area is relatively new and the results are inconsistent, but generally studies suggest that the internet has a
disinhibiting effect that facilitates offending behaviour.68 There is a significant risk that consuming
sexualised imagery of minors and sexually abusing minors ‘may exist in a mutually enforcing
dynamic’.69 Police views and IIAC commissioned assessments suggest that between 16% and 50% of
child abuse cyber criminals will later commit physical offences, 70 fewer criminal justice interventions
certainly means that more potentially dangerous offenders will remain unknown to the police and thus
evade child safeguarding measures.
This safeguarding systemwascreated toprotect children andvulnerable adults following theSohamchild
murders in 2002. Adoptive parents, salaried workers and volunteers are vetted for evidence of criminal
behaviour that could indicate a risk of harm if there is future regular contact with children.71 Under these
arrangements persons convicted or cautioned for anoffence, inter alia, under s 1 of the 1978act or s 160 of the
1988 Act are automatically barred from such activities and roles.72 The police also have discretion to reveal
information about an IIOC incident to a potential employer etc. for safeguarding purposes, even if proceed-
ings were not initiated. The exercise of discretion has to be proportionate and, as a process undertaken by a
public authority, the decision making process can be challenged through judicial review.
As noted earlier, the potential complexity of criminal justice casework decisions relating to IIOC is
reduced by the limited defences to possession etc. under s 1 PCA 1978 or s 160 CJA 1988. There is a
downside to this that is relevant to the advantages and, in some respects, the need for the response to
IIOC images to remain in the hands of adequately resourced and publicly accountable agencies. When
65. ICSA (n 24) 42.
66. P Roberts and A Zuckerman, Criminal Evidence (2nd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2010) 11.
67. For a discussion of primary and secondary harm, see Gillespie (n 26) 231–6.
68. Broadhurst (n 2) 317–9.
69. Yar (n 5) 485.
70. Home Affairs Committee (n 23) para 85.
71. ACRO (n 52) 43.
72. Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS), Factsheet 5: Relevant Offences <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/157242/dbs-factsheet-05.pdf> accessed 14 January 2020. There are limited
grounds to appeal DBS decisions under the Safeguarding Vulnerable Groups Act 2006.
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these statutes were enacted, Parliament could not have anticipated self-generated imaging (SGI, or
‘youth sexting’). To avoid wrongly criminalising young people the police were encouraged in 2015 not
to initiate proceedings in certain circumstances: where the making and sharing of the image is ‘non-
abusive and there is no evidence of exploitation, grooming, profit motive, malicious intent (e.g. exten-
sive or inappropriate sharing . . . ) or . . . persistent behaviour’. The police were also advised to exercise
discretion in disclosing information about such an incident, should the young person responsible later
apply for a safeguarding check.73
This issue also might cast further light on the downward statistical trends. FOI data obtained by The
Guardian suggests that as a result of the 2015 guidance only 0.5% of SGIs incidents involving children
under 14 over almost 34 months up to August 2019 resulted in a charge, caution or court proceedings.74
With 241 SGI under 14 investigations a month, this change in policy could have had a significant impact
on the IIOC intervention statistics with a total of 500 child abuse arrests each month according to the
police (2019)75 and the Government (2020)76 There is certainly a temporal correlation between the
publication of the 2015 guidance and the emergence of downward trends, particularly when allowance is
made for the initially inconsistent application of the guidance by different police forces.77
Sexting is a risky behaviour, but Gillespie (writing prior to the 2015 guidance) suggested that the
alternative to adolescent criminalisation was:
A more proportionate approach would be to recognise this harm by requiring the identification and prosecu-
tion of the individual who distributes the images more widely, including to the Internet at large.78
This begins to reach the heart of the government policy inconsistency in the current collaborative arrange-
ments. This can be seen more clearly in the different treatment of adults as individual citizens compared
with the laissez faire approach to industry, either corporate entities or their senior executives. In 2019 a
senior police officer, Supt. Williams, received unsolicited (it seems from newspaper reports not to have
been disputed) IIOC images on her phone and alone among 15 other recipients of these images was
prosecuted.79 In contrast to this, ISPs and the providers of platforms towhich photographs can be uploaded
and then generally accessed—including ‘revenge’ sites’ - enjoy impunity from any culpability for IIOC
offences in England and Wales, indicated in a Government statement:
The prohibition of content on the Internet, that is potentially illegal under this law by British internet service
providers, is however self-regulatory, coordinated by the non-profit charity Internet Watch Foundation (who
has partnerships with many major ISPs in the country). The IWF operates in informal partnership with the
police, government, public and Internet service providers.80
73. Known as ‘Outcome 21 Guidance ‘, College of Policing, Briefing Note: Police Action in Response to Youth Produced Sexual
Imagery (‘Sexting’) (College of Policing, Ryton 2016) 5.
74. J Halliday, ‘Alarm as Over 6,000 Children are Investigated by Police for “Sexting”’ The Guardian (31 December 2019) 9.
75. IICSA (n 24) 2.4 puts the figure at ‘approximately 400–450’, but that figure was given to inquiry in May 2019. The figure used
here reflects police officer reports of an ‘average 500 or so each month’ at Chatham House Rule events organised by City
Forum on 24 October 2019 and the NPCC on 19–21 November 2019.
76. DDCMS and Home Office (n 9) 1.
77. E Bond and A Phippen, Police Response to Youth Offending Around the Generation and Distribution of Indecent Images of
Children and its Implications (University of Suffolk and the Marie Collins Foundation, Ipswich 2019).
78. AA Gillespie, ‘Adolescents, Sexting and Human Rights’ (2013) 13 Human Rights Law Review 642.
79. V Dodd, ‘Police Chief Convicted of Having Child Sexual Abuse Video on Phone’ The Guardian (20 November 2019) 25; V
Dodd, ‘Top Officer in Child abuse Video Case Faces Sack before Appeal’ The Guardian (11 December 2019) 24; V Dodd,
Highly praised officer is sacked by Met over abuse video conviction’ The Guardian (14 March 2020) 27.
80. Letter dated 31 July 2012 from James Eke, Foreign Policy and Security Group, British Embassy, Washington, D.C., but treated
as ‘current and verified as of 15 November 2018’ in the International Centre for Missing & Exploited Children, Child Sexual
Abuse Material: Model Legislation & Global Review (ICMEC, Alexandria VA 2018) ii, 58.
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This can be compared with how, for example, German law (backed by significant financial penalties and
without an industry-financed regulatory intermediary) requires social media platforms to remove ‘mani-
festly unlawful’ content within a specified time.81 With Brexit, but possibly not (see below) with a UK-
US trade deal, the UK need no longer be bound by EU law that has privileged competitive claims made
on behalf of the ITC industry.82 Government deference to internet commercial interests and unwilling-
ness apparently to adequately finance legal intervention is clear from the contrast with the often strict
corporate liability under English law for many health and safety offences or even, at a higher threshold
for legal intervention, obscene theatrical performances.83
Limits to Collaboration—ACNs, the Deep Web, ISPs That Are
Beyond Regulation and Social Media Platforms ‘Going Dark’
This section explains the limits of what is apparently achievable through government-industry accords for
image suppression on the surface web by considering how criminals exploit platforms and communication
networks that (a) cannot be regulated (ACNs and surface web services operated from countries that are
relatively safe for cybercriminals84) and (b) are not regulated (but could be) such as commercially provided
encryption, for example, Signal (‘going dark’) and police responses. This includes the combination of
anonymization techniques, for example, the combined WhatsApp and ACN connectivity revealed by
Operation Tantalio’s investigation into IIOC distribution.85 Consideration of these issues also underlines
how policy inconsistency between criminal justice interventions on the surface web (for which the Gov-
ernment appears to have a limited appetite) may weaken the policing of anonymised web communication.
This is a domain where successive governments have strengthened the role and surveillance powers of the
state and where this Government wishes, as will be considered in the next section, to go much further.
It is obviously even more difficult to estimate the scale of IIOC offending on ACNs than on the
surface web or the volume of crime that uses a combination of different web levels, or the volume of
IIOC images involved:
. . . virtually all reports made to the [NCMEC] CyberTipline relate to content that is being shared, stored, and
distributed on the open web, not the dark web. . . . though NCMEC is aware that the dark web is increasingly
where new, and virulently explicit, child sexual exploitation content is solicited, traded, and discussed among
predators.86
81. Communications Committee, Regulating in a digital world (HL 2017–19, 299) paras 183–185 indicated that it was clear from
this example that Art 15 of Directive 2000/31/EC Directive on electronic commerce [2000] OJ L 178/0001, which ensures
online intermediaries are not liable for illegal content found on their services, is not a barrier legally to such a law enforceable
with substantial financial penalties. With Brexit, but possibly not (see below) with a UK-US trade deal, the UK could go much
further in bringing the industry within the scope of criminal and civil proceedings for non-compliance with IIOC policing and
social regulation requirements.
82. For example, Case C-70/10 Scarlet Extended SA v SABM [2011] ECR I-12006 determined that an ISP could not be required to
prevent its users from downloading copyright protected works without authorisation and without paying royalties via peer-to-
peer networks.
83. ‘Where any offence under this Act committed by a body corporate is proved to have been committed with the consent or
connivance of, or to be attributable to any neglect on the part of [senior corporate staff], he as well as the body corporate shall
be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly’: Theatres Act 1968s 16.
84. For the latter see: J Lusthaus, Industry of Anonymity (Harvard UP, Cambridge MA 2018) 181–189.
85. Led by the Spanish police, 18 agencies identified 130 suspects in 15 countries: Europol, Press Release 18 April 2017 ‘Global
action tackles distribution of child sexual exploitation images via WhatsApp: 39 arrested so far, <https://www.europol.europa.
eu/newsroom/news/global-action-tackles-distribution-of-child-sexual-exploitation-images-whatsapp-39-arrested-so-far>
accessed 11 December 2019.
86. Shehan (n 56) 2–3.
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The IWF has suggested that less than 1% of child sexual abuse URLs is on ACNs.87 However, the Home
Office estimated in 2019 that 140,000 user accounts registered on the worst child abuse sites on ACNs
are located in the UK.88 Such sites have many users: a single ACN child abuse site hosted in Queensland
(‘The Love Zone’) had 45,000 members.89
Image suppression on the regulated parts of the surface web may be less effective in curbing crime
than might be hoped. During 2014 Microsoft and Google achieved a 67% reduction in child sexual
exploitation searches in the USA, but the Russian based search engine Yandex was known to have been
used by American residents. Empirical research into whether, how and to what extent police and
commercial interventions against cybercrime result in displacement is at an early stage. The authors
of one pioneering study (financial not IIOC crimes) noted, however, the creativity of cyber criminals and
concluded that effective police and private sector responses can result in at least some displacement that
takes different forms (e.g. from personal bank accounts to corporate targets and from banks in one
country where security is strong to those where crime prevention is weak).90 This problem is not really
addressed in Online Harms, although the known displacement of terrorist activity to less hostile loca-
tions as a result of more intensive effort by companies to supress extremist content is acknowledged.91
What is particularly troubling about potential cross-border IIOC crime displacement on the surface web
is that commercial benefits would accrue to the new platform hosts. More users translates into increased
advertising revenue for sites that do not take down such images, as noted in another path-finding study of
criminal displacement, on the internet ‘further monetizing the sexual exploitation of children’.92
The potential relationship between the legal impact of the future Online Harms legislation and
internet policing in domains beyond regulation, however, might also extend to equipment interference
(‘hacking’) and distributed denial of service attacks (DDOS), both of which are lawful and like bulk data
analysis subject to oversight by the Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office (IPCO).93 These
exceptional state activities also provide important precedents for how criminal law may override the
legal privileges that the digital industry enjoys under commercial and regulatory law.
UK policing and harm reduction on other domains, including encrypted communications interception
is undertaken by the state agencies, chiefly the National Crime Agency (NCA) and individual police
forces supported by regional crime units, the intelligence services and specialist agencies such as HM
Revenue and Customs. Their work has an operational link with the surface web collaboration arrange-
ments and will involve the same industry or NGO participants. For example, when ACN sites hosting
IIOC material are taken down the NCMEC assists in this process by identifying first-generation seized
images that had not been previously been logged in their IIOC database, and already shared nationally
and internationally with police agencies and or other specialist child protection NGOs.94 Criminal justice
interventions, however, are not dependent on voluntary assistance. For example, bulk data analysis (the
analysis of communication footprints, often on the deep web (e.g. bank account records) but also on the
surface web, enables state agencies to identify clusters of criminal activity in order to identify UK
87. IWF (n 7) 32.
88. T Pilgrim, ‘Javid announces ‘game-changing’ tech to boost fight against online child abuse’ Care Appointments (12 July 2019)
<https://careappointments.com/care-news/england/130086/javid-announces-game-changing-tech-to-boost-fight-against-
online-child-abuse/> accessed 3 February 2020.
89. SD Brown ‘Hacking for evidence: the risks and rewards of deploying malware in pursuit of justice’ (2020) 20 ERA Forum 428.
90. F Jansen and J van Lenthe, ‘Adaption Strategies of Cybercriminals to Interventions from Public and Private Sectors’ in TJ Holt
(ed), Cybercrime through an Interdisciplinary Lens (Routledge, Abingdon 2019) 210–41.
91. DDCMS and Home Office (n 9) para 1.10 and 14 (Box 2).
92. CMS Steel, ‘Web-based Child Pornography: The Global Impact of Deterrence Efforts and its Consumption on Mobile
Platforms’ (2015) 44 Child Abuse & Neglect 157.
93. See Brants et al. (n 35) and Davies (n 35) in this issue for the legislation and discussion of ICPO’s oversight role.
94. US Justice Department, South Korean National and Hundreds of Others Charged Worldwide in the Takedown of the Largest
Darknet Child Pornography Website, Which was Funded by Bitcoin (16 October 2019) <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/
south-korean-national-and-hundreds-others-charged-worldwide-takedown-largest-darknet-child> accessed 16 April 2020.
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citizens who pay to access extreme IIOC material.95 This is permitted by statute and because such
surveillance engages Convention privacy and sometimes fair trial rights, the law requires that it should
be supervised by IPCO, to ensure that such powers are used proportionately.96
Judgements about proportionality can pivot on theweight attached to the public objective, expressed in
another common law jurisdiction as a ‘sufficient importance’ test.97 It may be arguable that an absence of
policy consistency—including (judging by current statistical trends) over resource allocation to maintain
or increase criminal justice interventions together with irresolution about seeking effective powers to
require industry action where less invasive techniques can be used (e.g. on the surface web)—might
weaken a proportionality claim to justify the use of exceptional measures against an ACN, surface web
encryption, or a platform well beyond UK regulation. It would certainly be difficult to reconcile a claim
that the statemust always be able to intervenewith the full force of the criminal law against IIOC crimes in
such domains, when (a) its policies only allow for very limited and diminishing criminal justice interven-
tions on the unencrypted surface webwhere most IIOC images are to be found and (b) even uncooperative
corporate entities enjoy impunity from prosecution or exceptional protection from civil litigation.
Such exceptional activities have a further linkwith the impact of neoliberal policies on criminal justice:
how government technological development and research capabilities on which police and other state
agencies at one time relied are now either seriously inadequate or non-existent.98 As a result the police and
other government agencies rely on themarketplace for hacking devices and services. A law suit brought by
WhatsApp/Facebook against NSO, an Israeli cybersecurity device developer in October 2019 exposed
some of the risks arising from this. It was alleged that NSO’s malware product Pegasus99 had been used
against diplomats, senior government officials, human rights activists, dissidents and journalists, includ-
ing people linked to the Saudi journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, who was assassinated inside the Saudi con-
sulate in Istanbul. Allegedly it is effective against many commonly used smartphone operating systems,
including Apple’s iOS, Google’s Android, Microsoft’s Windows Phone and Samsung’s Tizen. NSO’s
response was that it did not itself use malware operationally and that its state security agency customers
could have their use of the malware stopped for a breach of licence conditions. That, of course, does not
answer the obvious question: would such a breach be reported by such customers?
The litigation revealed how a combination of neoliberal policies—fiscal austerity, the hollowing-out
of state capabilities and minimal regulation—has resulted in revenue from state agencies funding the
commercialised development of advanced surveillance devices and services that may be acquired by
rogue states and criminals. According to The Wall Street Journal, the publicity from the Pegasus affair
compromised a criminal justice investigation into suspected anti-terrorist activity.100 Similarly, Home
95. GCHQ, ‘GCHQ and NCA Join Forces to Ensure No Hiding Place Online for Criminals’ (6 November 2015) <https://www.
gchq.gov.uk/news/gchq-and-nca-join-forces-ensure-no-hiding-place-online-criminals> accessed 31 March 2020.
96. Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA) pt 6.
97. The Canadian Oakes test requires an objective ‘of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected
freedom’, K Moller, ‘Constructing the Proportionality Test: An Emerging Global Conversation’ in L Lazarus, C McCrudden
and N Bowles (eds), Reasoning Rights: Comparative Judicial Engagement (Oxford, Hart 2016) 34.
98. The situation in England and Wales is now so dire that when the Government appointed Forensic Science Regulator (FSR)
arranged an initial validation study of commercially sourced kiosks used by the police to extract and begin to analyse data
held on a device, the results could not (initially at least) be fully disseminated to police forces and no mechanism was
available to keep that work up-to-date: FSR oral evidence, Science and Technology Committee, Forensic science and the
criminal justice system: a blueprint for change (HL 2017–19 333) Q209.
99. After dialling the target phone, even if it is not answered, it is claimed that encrypted content can be accessed. Pegasus was
said to have been used against 1,400 mobile phones across 20 countries.
100. This story has been reported extensively on the Deutsche Welle (DW) website: ‘WhatsApp attacked by advanced spyware
via missed calls’ (14 May2019) <https://www.dw.com/en/whatsapp-attacked-by-advanced-spyware-via-missed-calls/a-
48726819>; D Regev, ‘WhatsApp attacked by advanced spyware via missed calls’ (17 May 2019) <https://www.dw.com/en/
whatsapps-security-breach-made-in-israel-implemented-worldwide/a-48740524>; ‘Whatsapp sues Israeli company over
spyware scandal’ (30 October 2019); L Sanders IV, ‘Israeli Spyware Firm Threatens to “Shut Down” Abusers’ (9 February
2020), accessed 4 March 2020.
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Office evidence to IICSA indicated that one ACN site required its subscribers to upload 20 ‘first-
generation images’, as an alternative to a two-minute video of infant or toddler abuse, each month.101
Unless there was an element of bluff to this, presumably the criminals involved were able to access the
same or similar image analysis software as that used internationally by police, intelligence services and
anti-abuse NGOs, or as a result of corruption, an image suppression database.
The Future Evolution (and Its Potential Limitations) of the
Collaborative Justice Interventions and Harm Reduction Model
The Online Harms White Paper
The premise of UK Government’s Online Harms White Paper (April 2019)102 is that the current
voluntary collaborative justice and harm reduction model is failing:
There is currently a range of regulatory and voluntary initiatives aimed at addressing [online harms], but these
have not gone far or fast enough, or been consistent enough between different companies, to keep UK users
safe online.103
The term ‘online harms’ covers an extensive range of ‘illegal or unacceptable content and activity’ on
the surface web, ranging from the availability of illegal images (including IIOC) to ‘unacceptable
behaviours’ (e.g. social media algorithms that create ‘echo chambers’ or ‘filter bubbles’) or some forms
of commercial exploitation (e.g. designed addiction to digital services).104
These problems are to be addressed by the creation of an overarching state authority that will
empower an independent regulator to impose duties on the industry to undertake social regulation over
surface web services, including IIOC image suppression, in order to reduce the risk of harm for users.
This would undoubtedly be an improvement on the current voluntary and variable collaborative arrange-
ments on which the police rely for assistance with IIOC crimes. The Online Harms proposals, however,
are concerned primarily with influencing commercial behaviour, including industry-customer relations,
and conceived in a policy making environment with expertise in the regulation of commercial entertain-
ment or consumer services. This can be seen in how the Government’s proposals for ‘user redress’
envisage ‘an independent review mechanism to ensure that users have confidence that their concerns are
being treated fairly’.105 This is a far cry from action against IIOC offenders and the level of harm
suffered by their victims.
IICSA published an investigation report about the nature and extent of the use of the internet to
facilitate child sexual abuse in March 2020.106 This called for a more effective response to IIOC,107
expressing specific concerns about both the corporate response to live streamed child abuse and the
uncertain pace of the Government’s implementation of its Online Harms plans:
We are unconvinced that internet companies fully understand the scale of the problem of live streaming on
their platforms such that they can properly assess whether they employ sufficient numbers of moderators to
detect such offending.108
101. IICSA (n 24) 17.
102. DDCMS and the Home Office (n 9). This reference also cites evidence of the intended continuity of the proposed policies
under the Johnson Administration.
103. Ibid para 8.
104. Ibid paras 2–6.
105. DDCMS and Home Office (n 9) 3.26–3.30.
106. IICSA (n 24).
107. Ibid 2 and para 95.
108. Ibid 3.
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The Online Harms proposals are wide-ranging but the timetable for implementation of this legislation is
unclear. The prospective interim code of practice in respect of child sexual abuse and exploitation offers a
very real opportunity to make children in the UK safer online.109 We therefore unhesitatingly recommend that
the interim code is published without further delay.110
IICA also noted how ‘encryption poses a real risk to the ability of law enforcement to detect and
investigate online-facilitated child sexual abuse’.111
Critique of the Online Harms White Paper from the Perspective of IIOC Issues
US commercial considerations and neoliberal hostility to regulation could negate this initiative. It was
suggested in Parliament during 2019 that the required observance of some aspects of US commercial
internet law in the US trade agreements with Canada, Mexico and Japan, if applied to a post-Brexit UK-
US trade deal, ‘would basically wipe away all the [proposed Online Harms] legislation’.112 Even if the
proposals are abandoned or significantly modified, the value of examining them in their original form is
that at this early stage the neoliberal assumptions or mind-set reflected in the policy document is likely to
be most apparent. This is done by considering whether Online Harms is really likely to result in a
fundamental break with earlier neoliberal reluctance to interfere with the free market relating to the
internet by considering four issues, evidence of intent, funding, regulatory compromises over innovation
and smaller enterprises, and regulator designation.
For anyone hoping for evidence of a decisive shift in Government thinking about how to deal more
effectively with IIOC crimes, a general concern arises from its significantly more circumspect (or
reluctant) criticism of voluntary arrangements than near contemporary NCMEC evidence to the US
Senate:
. . .many technology companies that embrace their societal and corporate responsibilities to manage content
on their platforms and to actively detect and remove child sexual exploitation content . . . [However,] too
many companies are not proactive in fighting this insidious problem of online child sexual abuse material and
engage in half-measures, decline to participate in voluntary initiatives or information-sharing opportunities,
and too often put child protection secondary to organizational financial and broader liability concerns.113
There is certainly no sign of a diminution in neoliberal influence over funding plans. Consistent with
even UK physical border security (another Home Office responsibility),114 the new collaborative model
system is likely to continue to rely on user-generated revenues and little or no support from taxpayers.115
For online protection as much as border control, the Government’s eventual fiscal objective is described,
in classic neoliberal language, as a ‘cost neutral’ solution (no net public sector funding).116
109. Ibid 3.10: The codes to which it refers in its report concern both child abuse and anti-terrorism measures. The Government
envisages taking powers to issue direct to the regulator about their content and to approve draft codes before they are brought
into effect. It is envisaged that the regulator will not normally permit companies exemptions from observing these and would
‘require a high burden of proof that alternative proposals will be effective’.
110. Ibid 3.
111. Ibid 2.
112. Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee, Oral evidence on 16 October 2019: The work of the Department for Digital,
Culture, Media and Sport, HC 2019 71) Q627.
113. Shehan (n 56) 3.
114. Wilson (n 59) 5–6.
115. ‘The regulator will be funded by industry in the medium term, and the government is exploring options such as fees, charges
or a levy to put it on a sustainable footing. This could fund the full range of the regulator’s activity, including producing codes
of practice, enforcing the duty of care, preparing transparency reports, and any education and awareness activities undertaken
by the regulator’. DDCMS and the Home Office (n 9) para 37.
116. Ibid 98; Wilson (n 59) 6.
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Significant compromises in the Online Harms regulatory regime also reflect neoliberal assumptions.
For instance, the Government would not participate directly in economically sensitive decisions while
instructing the independent regulator about how it should balance public goods against commercial
arguments when exercising its new powers:
We would expect the regulator to . . . [support and encourage] innovation . . . , subject to minimum expecta-
tions of user safety. . . . to take a flexible, proportionate and risk-based approach when setting and enforcing
expectations and responsibilities for companies.117
The issues can be complex, with limited empirical research to guide the regulator. It appears, however,
that for both data protection118 and social regulation generally,119 regulation can boost as well as hinder
competiveness.
Another significant compromise is differential regulation determined by firm size and a claimed lack
of capacity and capability rather than risk of harm:
Regulation can impose a disproportionate burden on smaller companies. Badly designed regulation can stifle
innovation by giving an advantage to large companies that can handle compliance more easily. We are
determined that this regulatory framework should provide strong protection for our citizens while avoiding
placing an impossible burden on smaller companies.120
This reveals an internal contradiction within the Online Harms document itself. It draws attention to the
known displacement of terrorist activity to less hostile locations (‘more permissive and smaller plat-
forms’) as a direct result of more intensive efforts by larger companies to supress extremist content. 121
The Government suggests that the solution to such problems is (a) for the regulator to be required to
balance the resources of smaller companies against ‘the risk and prevalence of harms on their service’122
and (b) greater support (from larger firms as much as or more than from government) for example, by
developing new ‘AI products’) for free use by smaller companies.123 Ultimately, this proposed regula-
tory compromise could still allow some companies to continue to enjoy total legal immunity should they
fail to take action against IIOC crimes and, as indicated in the fourth section, indiscriminate access to
specialist software and devices carries a significant risk of such resources falling into the wrong hands.
The neoliberal influence over the Online Harms approach can also be seen in the announcement in
February 2020 that Ofcom would add On-line Harms regulation to its existing television, radio and
telecoms remit.124 This was influenced by Ofcom analysis of how the same content can be subject to
different regulatory standards depending on the platform on which it appears. The Government’s deci-
sion could be anticipated from its emphasis on finding a solution to ‘significant gaps in consumer
protection’ for the commercially provided services considered in On-line Harms.125
Irrespective of the general merits of this choice of Ofcom, this body may not be a suitable regulator
for dealing with criminal justice issues. Technical reservations about the Government’s decision can be
found in industry views about regulatory structures for the internet:
117. Ibid para 5.11.
118. NMartin, C Matt, C Niebel and K Blind, ‘How Data Protection Regulation Affects Startup Innovation’ (2019) 21 Inform Syst
Front 1307–1324.
119. Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy (BEIS) Research Paper Series Number 2020/002: Innovative
Businesses’ Views on the Regulatory Environment and Regulatory Support (BEIS, London 2020).
120. DDCMS and Home Office (n 9) 56 (Box 26).
121. Ibid para 1.10 and 14 (Box 2).
122. Ibid para 7.12.
123. Ibid paras at para 8.9 and (Box 28) (page 79), for how this was done by the industry provided anti-grooming tool.
124. HL Deb 12 February 2020, vol 671 cols 27-28WS.
125. DDCMS and Home Office (n 9) 2.8.
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a. Simply adapting, modifying or extending the core capabilities of a traditional regulator is
insufficient when introducing internet regulation, as highly specialist proficiency in data,
operations, and online content’ will also be required.126
b. Regulation might be more effective if based on specific ‘sectors’ which all have a separately
designated regulator with sector specific expertise.127
Interestingly, these views are in fact consistent with the regulatory and supervisory structure that has
emerged within criminal justice. Because separate regulators (e.g. the Forensic Science Regulator (FSR),
the Bioinformation Commissioner and the Information Commissioner) and inspectorates (e.g.
HMICFRS and the CPS Inspectorate)—each with different specialist foci and skills involving the police
or police related matters—liaise closely and regularly engage in joint projects, multiple and overlapping
regulation does not result in a dysfunctional system.128
Given the importance of the private sector harm reduction and criminal justice intervention interface,
concurrent or possibly more extensive powers to those to be conferred on Ofcom are likely to be required
for criminal justice bodies that might need to engage in direct inspection and supervision of industry
and NGO practice and policies. Probative and procedural problems will inevitably arise at the inter-
face about the reliability, accuracy, comprehensiveness and interpretation of data received from
industry and NGOs. These may need to be resolved through inspections, thematic studies guidance
from variously or jointly HMICFRS, the CPS inspectorate and the FSR. Likewise, while there is
disagreement among legal scholars about when surveillance of public messages on social media
engages the right to privacy, it is likely that a systematic analysis of all messages to identify the
sharing of IIOC images would do so.129 Such activities cannot be entrusted to private companies or
NGOs without direct public supervision and inspection. An obvious solution would be to give IPCO a
supervisory and inspectorate role. The Online Harms arrangements will inevitably engage Convention
privacy and sometimes fair-trial rights. ICPO has the judicial authority and inspectorial experience to
enforce-compliance with Convention rights in police and other regulatory interventions at all levels of
and locations on the web.
A Government-Industry Encryption Key Accord?
Zuboff’s account of how government-industry accords can extend surveillance without regard to privacy
safeguards,130 demonstrates the major risks arising from various initiatives to negotiate encryption key
(‘backdoor access’) to encrypted communication. A 2019 initiative to achieve this was organised by the
Government that directly linked it to IIOC crimes.
The communique´ issued for this initiative by the Five Eyes countries (essentially ‘Anglosphere’
countries and for that event rebadged as ‘Five Countries’)131 veered perilously close to echoing the
Sino-Russian surveillance playbook132 in the link with IIOC crimes:
126. M Bickert, Charting a Way Forward: Online Content Regulation (Facebook, Menlo Park CA 2020) 19.
127. Communications Committee (n 81) para 30.
128. A relevant analogy that puts this question in perspective is how expert scientific decisions in the criminal justice system are
better served by a complex system of interlocking forms of regulation and how the risk of dysfunctionality is greater when the
alternative is the application of ideological purity rather than scientific rigour, see Ward (n 11).
129. Gillespie (n 26) 354.
130. Zuboff (n 54) 112–21.
131. Australia, Canada, New Zealand, USA and UK; the ‘Five Country Ministerial: Emerging Threats’ meetings involved
ministers for home affairs, interior, security and immigration and attorney generals.
132. For an account of 2016 Moscow Sino-Russian event described as ‘the industry’s prime conference on online child and adult
safety’ that preceded the extension of Chinese style web censorship and surveillance to Russia, see J Griffiths, The Great
Firewall of China (Zed Books, London 2019) 247–52.
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1. In five years, we have seen a near twenty-fold increase in industry referrals of child abuse material . . . ,
from 1 million in 2014 to over 18 million in 2018. Driven by the moral obligation to tackle this escalating
crisis we met representatives from Facebook, Google, Microsoft, Roblox, Snap and Twitter. . . .
6. . . . it is imperative that all sectors of the digital industry including Internet Service Providers, device
manufacturers and others continue to consider the impacts to the safety of children, including those who are
at risk of exploitation, when developing their systems and services. In particular, encryption must not be
allowed to conceal or facilitate the exploitation of children (author’s emphasis).133
This proposal to bypass encryption, like earlier attempts was rejected by industry. The minsters simply
reaffirmed Five Countries—industry voluntary cooperation against online child abuse as ‘a set of
principles that would help to shine a light on this issue and provide some critical guidance to industry
in what they can do to help’.134 Though what eventually appeared on the Home Office website eight
months later was much bolder in tone, referring to the need for ‘an immediate upscaling of the global
response . . . to ensure that there is no safe space online for offenders to operate’.135
The Government’s credibility—as the meeting’s host and thereby organiser136—was in any case
swiftly compromised by a decision to transfer Conservative MP communications from encryption
protected WhatsApp to the Signal platform.137 In addition to encryption, Signal’s standard commercial
offering includes an option for the automatic deletion of all traces of communication even among
recipients (the Disappearing Messaging feature) and a ‘burner’ (dummy account) number can be
obtained by signing up to Signal through Google Voice Communication.138 Ironically, well before
Conservative MPs changed their social media brand, the FBI was known to have hacked encrypted
Signal messages sent by Congressional officials and journalists.139
The industry’s arguments against backdoor access are that it would be ‘a “gift” to criminals, hackers
and repressive regimes’.140 Certainly the technologically based argument that encryption keys would
represent a ‘U-turn from the best practices now being deployed to make the Internet more secure’ enjoys
considerable international support. An increasing international consensus on this is evident from a 2015
report by the Special Rapporteur for the UN Human Rights Council and in the UN General Assembly in
133. Five Country Ministerial: Emerging Threats, London 2019, Communique´, <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/
five-country-ministerial-communique/five-country-ministerial-ommunique-emerging-threats-london-2019> accessed 11
December 2019.
134. New Zealand Department of Internal Affairs (NZDIA) web page, Voluntary Principles to Counter Online Child Sexual
Exploitation and Abuse <https://www.dia.govt.nz/Voluntary-Principles-to-Counter-Online-Child-Sexual-Exploitation-and-
Abuse> accessed 17 April 2020.
135. Home Office, Voluntary Principles to Counter Online Child Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (5 March 2020) <https://www.
gov.uk/government/publications/voluntary-principles-to-counter-online-child-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse> accessed 17
April 2020.
136. Based on the author’s contribution when a senior civil servant to UK hosted EU presidency and G7 meetings.
137. The party argued that following the 2019 Election that the number of Conservative MPs exceeded the WhatsApp maximum
group size. J Waterson, ‘MPs Switched from WhatsApp to Stop Leaks’ The Guardian (18 December 2019) 11.
138. J Knight, Four Ways to Hide All Traces of your Message Using Signal Private Messenger, 2 June 2018 <https://smartphones.
gadgethacks.com/how-to/4-ways-hide-all-traces-your-messages-using-signal-private-messenger-0182633/> accessed 19
December 2019.
139. L Hay Newman, ‘Encrypted Messaging Isn’t Magic’, Wired, 14 June 2018 <https://www.wired.com/story/encrypted-mes
saging-isnt-magic/> accessed 19 December 2019.
140. C Hymas, ‘Facebook rejects Priti Patel’s calls to open up encryption to help in fight against terrorists and child abusers’ Daily
Telegraph (10 December 2019) <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/politics/2019/12/10/facebook-rejects-priti-patel-calls-open-
encryption-help-fight/> accessed 14 January 2020. This is the same argument used by Apple in rejecting a FBI request to
assist that agency to bypass encryption in 2016, Apple, A Message to Our Customers (16 February 2016) <https://www.
apple.com/customer-letter/> accessed 4 May 2020.
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2016, which is supported by the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP).141 In addition there
are strong grounds for public distrust, manifested for example in greater use of ACNs and the clear trend of
the internet darkening. This will reflect in part the impact of the Snowden revelations.142 Regaining public
trust to resolve the encryption key issuewill also bemore difficult because of a better public understanding
(thanks to scholars such as Zuboff) of the trade-off to abandon industry regulation in return for hidden
surveillance assistance.
There may, however, now be common ground that allows a way forward on the encryption key issue for
both governments and industry. For the industry, the NSO litigation was effectively a game changer as
Facebook, in an unprecedented move, had fully acknowledged the vulnerability of commercial encryption
services. As far as governments are concerned the risks of police and intelligence agencies procuring tech-
nological development, devices and services in an unregulated market place are equally exposed now that it
can be seen as an enabler of serious crime. Both sets of interests have been damaged by the wider conse-
quences of neoliberalism and would benefit from legislative arrangements that provide the degree of judicial
and democratic supervision and transparency required to establish critical trust among informed citizens.
Conclusions
The encryption key impasse might be resolvable by building on the powers introduced in 2000 for the
judicial authorisation of access to protected information on, for example, a suspect’s telephone
(protected by an encryption key or password) under arrangements overseen by IPCO.143 Facebook -
although it does not use the terms - appears to have given considerable attention to the need to improve
critical trust and to have grasped the lessons of civic epistemology. Even if its apparent change of heart
towards the acceptance of Online Harms type social regulation, is a result of ‘tech lash’, from
customers/users frustrated over how web platforms profit from their data at a time when in its most
important markets, USA and Canada, user growth is stagnating,144 in other words evidence of the
potential influence of ‘an issue-specific public’.145 Certainly its publication about future internet
services regulation is much more sensitive to the wider question of restoring public trust than the
Government’s Online Harms document. Facebook acknowledges the importance of legal structures
and procedures for building trust among citizens who might have good reason to have lost faith in both
government and the digital industry:
Problems arise when people do not understand the decisions that are being made or feel powerless when those
decisions impact their own speech, behavior, or experience. People may expect similar due process channels
to those that they enjoy elsewhere in modern society.146
It acknowledges public nervousness of regulatory arrangements that lack the transparency of the legis-
lative process in democratic countries, ‘with due respect for human rights and, critically important for
reducing the likelihood of capricious restrictions on legitimate speech, the check of an impartial
141. M Gutheil, Q Liger, A Heetman, J Eager and M Crawford, Report for the Directorate General for Internal Policies Policy
Department C: Citizens’ Rights And Constitutional Affairs Civil Liberties, Justice And Home Affairs Legal Frameworks for
Hacking by Law Enforcement (European Parliament, Brussels 2017) 21–24.
142. EA Jones and E Martellozzo, ‘Introduction: Victims of Cybercrime in the Small “I” Internet’ in E Martellozzo and EA Jones
(eds), Cybercrime and its Victims (Routledge, Abingdon 2019) 9.
143. The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), Part 3; see also, R v S and another [2008] EWCA Crim 2177,
[2008] All ER (D) 89: (a) self- incrimination protection is not an absolute right and (b) does not apply to evidence which has
an existence independent of the person who holds the key.
144. N Drozdiak and Bloomberg, ‘Facebook CEO Zuckerberg looks to calm ‘tech lash’ with call for government rules on political
ads and data’ Fortune (17 February 2020) <https://fortune.com/2020/02/17/facebook-ceo-zuckerberg-eu-government-regu
lation/> accessed 17 February 2020.
145. Jasanoff (n18).
146. Bickert (n 126) 3–4.
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judiciary’.147 There are grounds for caution about Facebook’s current position not least now that it is
understood how free speech and privacy concerns were exploited at the end of the previous century to
evade regulation.148 Effective deliberative engagement with citizens and their representatives over a
balanced approach to these human rights issues will be critical in obtaining support for finding a
democratically acceptable way forward.
On specific issues relating to IIOC crimes, the analysis in this article also points to the importance of
bringing into any future deliberations about surface web regulation and encryption other issues: pre-
venting the hollowing out of criminal justice capacity and capabilities; ensuring compatibility and
consistency in operational responses and legal principles when dealing with IIOC crimes across all
levels of the web; and ensuring that the response to IIOC crimes focuses on the offenders and their
victims by accepting that image suppression alone is insufficient.
This article has attempted to offer an informed and constructive critique of the evolution and potential
future of collaborative justice and harm reduction in response to IIOC crimes as’ something to be
explained, not to be taken for granted’. It has sought to highlight potential ‘strategic deletions and
omissions’. In doing so it has emphasised the significance of genuine political and policy choices that
will determine how IIOC crimes are dealt with. In doing so it has warned against any mind-set that
considers or argues that decisions on and developments in technologically and scientifically focused
decision making are so determined by apparently impersonal economic and technological forces, that
there is no alternative to whatever government can negotiate with vested interests behind closed doors.
Acknowledgements
Comments on earlier versions of this paper from Dutch, Norwegian, Swedish and British research project col-
leagues, especially Professor Chrisje Brants, and Mark Ashley Parry’s research assistant support at a NPCC
sponsored conference held in November 2019 are gratefully acknowledged.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication
of this article.
Funding
The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of
this article: The author(s) received financial support for the research, authorship, and publication of this article from
NordForsk, the Economic and Social Sciences Research Council (ESRC) and the Netherlands Organisation for
Scientific Research (NWO) as funding for Police Detectives on the TOR-network: A Study on Tensions Between
Privacy and Crime-Fighting (project no. 80512).
147. Ibid 16.
148. See the extensive literature about s 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) 1996 and Reno v. ACLU 521 US 844
[1997]. The author is more sympathetic than Zuboff (n 54) 107–112, however, to the arguments made on behalf of some of
the litigators in Reno and the outcome of that case.
Wilson 23
